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Positive/negative externalities, Pigouvian taxes, public goods, free riders, and the Lorenz curve
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Markets allocate resources efficiently under tight assumptions: many buyers and sellers, well-defined property rights, no spillovers, and goods that everyone can be excluded from consuming. When those assumptions fail, the market produces too much or too little of a good โ a . The two most important sources are and .
An externality is a cost or benefit imposed on a third party who is not part of the transaction. Markets ignore these effects, so equilibrium quantity differs from the socially optimal quantity.
Negative externality (e.g., pollution): producer faces only its marginal private cost (MPC), not the full marginal social cost (MSC = MPC + external cost). Free-market output is HIGHER than the socially optimal . Result: deadweight loss equal to the triangle between MSC and demand from to .
Positive externality (e.g., vaccination, education): consumer's marginal private benefit (MPB) falls short of full marginal social benefit (MSB). Free-market output is LOWER than socially optimal. Deadweight loss equals the triangle between supply and MSB.
Government tools to fix externalities:
A pure public good is:
Examples: national defense, basic research, lighthouses, fireworks. Because consumers cannot be excluded, each has an incentive to free-ride โ wait for others to pay and then enjoy the benefit. The market under-provides public goods, so government typically funds them through taxes.
The socially optimal quantity of a public good is where vertical sum of MBs (because everyone consumes the same unit simultaneously) equals MC.
Non-excludable but rival (fisheries, public grazing land, freeway lanes). Subject to the Tragedy of the Commons โ overuse by individuals each pursuing self-interest. Solutions: privatization, regulation, quotas, user fees.
Almost every government policy debated today โ climate change, healthcare, education โ turns on externality and public-goods analysis.
A factory produces steel and emits pollution that imposes $3 of external cost per ton on neighboring farms. Without intervention, the market produces 1,000 tons. (a) Is this a positive or negative externality? (b) Is the market quantity above or below the social optimum? (c) State the size of the per-unit Pigouvian tax that would internalize the externality.
(a) Negative externality (pollution imposes cost on a third party).
(b) Market quantity is ABOVE the socially optimal quantity, because producers ignore the $3 external cost and over-produce.
(c) Pigouvian tax = exactly the per-unit external cost = $3 per ton. This raises MPC to MSC, making each producer face the true social cost.
Vaccinating against a contagious disease creates a positive externality of $50 per vaccination (lower spread reduces others' risk). The free market produces 1 million vaccinations; the social optimum is 1.4 million. (a) What size per-unit subsidy would push the market to the social optimum? (b) Who pays the subsidy and who receives it?
(a) A Pigouvian subsidy equal to the per-unit external benefit = $50 per vaccination would shift MPB up to MSB, equating private and social marginal benefit.
(b) The government pays the subsidy out of tax revenue; the subsidy is typically given to consumers (lower price at point of purchase) or producers (per-shot reimbursement). The economic incidence is shared between the two depending on demand and supply elasticities.
Distinguish a public good from a common-pool resource, naming the two key properties (excludability and rivalry) and giving one example of each.
Both are NON-EXCLUDABLE โ you cannot prevent unpaying users from consuming. The difference is rivalry.
Public good: non-excludable AND non-rival โ one person's consumption doesn't reduce another's. Example: national defense, basic scientific research, fireworks display.
Common-pool resource: non-excludable but rival โ one person's use REDUCES what is available to others. Example: an ocean fishery, an open grazing pasture, congested freeway lanes. Subject to the Tragedy of the Commons (overuse).
Demand for a positive-externality good is . Private supply is . Each unit produces an external benefit of $10. (a) Find the free-market equilibrium . (b) Find the socially optimal . (c) Compute the deadweight loss of the market outcome.
Compare a Pigouvian tax with a cap-and-trade system as ways to address pollution. Under what circumstances would you prefer one over the other? Address (a) certainty over emission levels, (b) certainty over price/cost, and (c) administrative simplicity.
Both achieve the efficient outcome IN PRINCIPLE, but they differ in what is fixed and what adjusts.
(a) Certainty over emissions: Cap-and-trade FIXES the total quantity of emissions (the cap). Tax fixes the per-unit price; total emissions adjust based on firms' responses. If we have a strict environmental target (e.g., a planetary COโ budget), cap-and-trade gives more certainty.
(b) Certainty over cost: Tax fixes the per-unit cost of polluting at a known level โ firms know their costs, planning is easier. Permit price under cap-and-trade can spike or crash with economic conditions, creating cost uncertainty.
(c) Administrative simplicity: A tax is simpler to administer (per-unit charge) and avoids the complications of permit allocation, monitoring trades, and enforcement. Cap-and-trade requires building a working permit market, monitoring trades, and policing emissions levels per firm.
Preference:
(a) Free market: where MPB = supply: .
(b) Social optimum: supply, where . Set .
(c) DWL is the triangle between MSB and supply, from to :
DWL = \tfrac{1}{2}(5)(10) = \boxed{\25}$.