Voting & Elections

The Electoral College is the constitutional mechanism for electing the President of the United States, established by Article II of the Constitution. Each state is allocated electors equal to its House delegation plus two senators (so a state like California has 54 electors — 52 House seats + 2 senators; Wyoming has 3 — 1 House seat + 2 senators). The 23rd Amendment (1961) gives Washington, D.C. 3 electors.

Total electors: 538 (435 House + 100 Senate + 3 D.C.).

A candidate needs a MAJORITY = 270 electoral votes to win the presidency.

Most states (48 + D.C.) use winner-take-all allocation: the candidate winning the state's popular vote gets all of the state's electors. Maine and Nebraska use the congressional district method (one elector per congressional district plus two for the statewide winner), making it possible to split a state's electors.

If no candidate reaches 270, the House of Representatives chooses the president, with each state delegation casting ONE vote — a procedure used twice (1800 and 1824) and a contingency that is occasionally raised but unlikely under modern conditions.

Because of the winner-take-all rule and population distribution, the Electoral College CAN produce a winner who lost the national popular vote — happened in 1824, 1876, 1888, 2000 (Bush), and 2016 (Trump).

1. Elections are held on Tuesdays and are not federal holidays. Most other democracies vote on weekends or declare a national holiday. American workers must take time off, find childcare, and travel to polling places — barriers that disproportionately affect low-income workers without flexible schedules.

2. Voters are responsible for registering, often well in advance. Most other established democracies have AUTOMATIC voter registration (the government registers all eligible adults). U.S. registration deadlines (sometimes 30 days before an election) and inconsistent online procedures depress turnout, particularly among young, low-income, and mobile voters.

3. Frequent and complex elections. Americans face elections every year for many offices and ballot questions; the resulting cognitive burden and "voter fatigue" depresses turnout, especially for non-presidential races.

4. Single-member, winner-take-all districts mean many voters in non-competitive districts feel their vote does not count. Proportional representation systems give every vote weight in the legislature, increasing turnout.

5. Lower party mobilization in safe districts. Political parties focus mobilization in swing states/districts, leaving voters in safe areas less contacted.

6. Voter ID laws and polling-place closures in some states impose extra costs on voting (especially for minority and low-income voters).

7. Cultural disengagement. Lower civic education, less union membership, and more political cynicism reduce participation.

(Other valid factors: felon disenfranchisement, mail-voting restrictions, gerrymandered districts.)

Closed primary: Only voters who are REGISTERED MEMBERS of a party can vote in that party's primary. Independents and members of other parties are excluded.

Open primary: ANY registered voter may choose which party's primary to vote in (typically can vote in only one party's primary in a given election). No party affiliation required.

(Semi-closed and other variants exist — independents allowed in but not members of opposing parties.)

Advantages of closed primaries:

• Party control. Parties can ensure only committed members choose their nominees, preventing outsiders from picking weak candidates or "raiding" to nominate someone unelectable.
• Coherent party brand. Nominees tend to reflect party priorities more accurately.
• Stronger party loyalty. Closed primaries can encourage voters to formally affiliate with a party.

Disadvantages of closed primaries:

• Excludes independents. Roughly 40% of American voters identify as independents and cannot participate in nominating contests, reducing democratic input.
• Empowers more ideologically extreme primary voters. Closed-primary voters tend to be more partisan and ideological than the general electorate, pulling nominees away from the median voter.
• Can produce nominees who are too extreme to win general elections.

Advantages of open primaries:

• Includes more voters, especially independents.
• May produce more moderate nominees who appeal to a broader cross-section of the electorate.
• More democratic in a small-d sense — fewer barriers to participation.

Disadvantages of open primaries:

• Strategic voting / "raiding." Voters from one party can cross over to vote in the other party's primary, potentially nominating a weak candidate (e.g., "Operation Chaos" calls in 2008 from Limbaugh to Republican voters to vote in Democratic primaries).
• Weakens party identity and discipline.
• Can produce nominees who do not represent the party's core members.

Real-world note: California and Washington use a non-partisan top-two primary — all candidates from all parties run on a single ballot, and the top two finishers (regardless of party) advance to the general election. Designed to produce more moderate nominees; produces same-party general elections in safe districts.

(a) Preclearance required that certain state and local jurisdictions — those with documented histories of voting discrimination — submit any change in voting laws or procedures (new voter ID laws, polling-place changes, redistricting maps) to the U.S. Department of Justice or the U.S. District Court for D.C. for advance approval BEFORE the change could take effect. Established in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, with the COVERAGE FORMULA (which jurisdictions were subject to preclearance) in Section 4(b). Approximately nine states (mostly Southern) and parts of others were covered.

(b) Why the Court struck it down (Roberts, 5–4): The majority held that the Section 4(b) coverage formula was UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it relied on data from the 1960s and 1970s — racial discrimination patterns from decades earlier — without sufficient updating. Roberts argued that "things have changed in the South" and that Congress could not impose preclearance based on outdated assumptions about which jurisdictions still discriminated. The Court did not strike down Section 5 itself but, because Section 5 has no operative coverage formula, it became effectively dormant. Congress has not passed an updated formula despite proposed legislation (John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act).

The dissent (Ginsburg) argued the majority had ignored extensive evidence Congress had compiled in 2006 of CONTINUING discrimination in covered jurisdictions and that "throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet."

(c) Practical effects since 2013:

1. Strict voter ID laws in covered states (Texas, North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama) — some struck down by federal courts, others survived. North Carolina's 2013 law was struck down by the Fourth Circuit as targeting Black voters "with almost surgical precision."

2. Polling-place closures. Hundreds of polling places have closed in covered jurisdictions, often disproportionately in minority neighborhoods. The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights documented over 1,600 polling places closed between 2012 and 2018 in formerly covered states.

3. Voter roll purges. Several covered states implemented aggressive purging of inactive voters (Ohio's "supplemental process" upheld in Husted v. APRI, 2018; Georgia's "exact match" laws).

4. Congressional redistricting in covered states proceeded without preclearance review; courts have struck down some maps as racial gerrymanders.

5. Increased burden on individual litigants. Section 2 of the VRA still allows lawsuits AFTER the fact, but plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent or effect — far slower and more expensive than preclearance.

The political fight over voting rights has shifted to state legislatures, state courts, and Congress. Federal legislation (Freedom to Vote Act, John Lewis Act) has been blocked by Senate filibuster. Roberts's prediction that "things have changed in the South" has been contested by post-2013 voting-rights litigation showing many of the same discriminatory patterns the VRA was designed to address.